عنوان مقاله [English]
In this paper, we study a two-echelon supply chain containing a manufacturer and a number of suppliers who face price and lead time sensitive demand. We use the Stackelberg game for the manufacturer as the leader, and the suppliers as followers. Since making decisions about price and lead time at the supply level is, simultaneously, under horizontal competition, we use the Nash Equilibrium. We assume that custom demand depends on manufacturing price. The proportion of demand the manufacturer assigns to each supplier is dependent on its price and scheduled lead time. The objective of each supplier is to choose the best price and lead time to maximize his/her functional profit. In todays competitive market, price and lead time are two important factors for the success of a company, and many companies use a short lead time as a marketing weapon to have more customers. Price and lead time are also highly interdependent, and some customers are willing to pay higher prices for shorter lead time. So, assessing the impacts of pricing and time performance strategies on demand, and the impacts of capacity decisions and issues related to company operations on these strategies, is very important. In this problem, we use the multiplicative competitive interaction function to model the market share by considering price and scheduled lead time. At first, the manufacturers optimal response is obtained, with regard to the response of the suppliers, and then the decision will be made at the suppliers level. We prove that there is a unique Nash equilibrium for the price and scheduled lead time of suppliers that is obtained by using an iterative algorithm. By numerical study, we will examine the impact of different market characteristics on the price and scheduled lead time determined by each supplier. The impact of the suppliers decision on that of the manufacturer, and its sensitivity analysis, with respect to the market situation, are also analyzed.